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Introduction 
In 1977, the Illinois general assembly passed the Tax Increment Allocation 
Redevelopment Act. The purpose of the act was to allow municipalities to 
capture increasing property taxes to pay for redevelopment of blighted areas. The 
law was amended in 1985 to include sales tax increments as well. Tax increment 
financing can be defined as a mechanism that "allows a community to recapture 
the increase in various state and local taxes that result from a redevelopment 
project in a blighted residential, conunercial or industrial area. The tax revenues 
obtained from the project which exceed the level of tax revenues generated by the 
area prior to redevelopment is called the "tax increment", hence the term tax 
increment financing (McLure 262)." 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) works like this: A municipality sets up a 
TlF district in a blighted area where little or no development has occurred. For 
large projects, bonds or contracts are sold by the municipalities to generate more 
money for improvements at the start of the program. Smaller projects use the 
increment for development on a "pay as you go" basis. In both cases, 
improvements are made to encourage private development in the area (Grueling 
23). The district's tax base is then assessed. It is reassessed at the end of each 
subsequent year. The difference between the two levels is the increment. This 
increment is used to help subsidize the cost of redevelopment with infrastructure 
improvements and other investment incentives. While TlF looks like an indirect 
tax break, it is much more efficient. If a tax break was given with the 
understanding that private business would make the needed infrastructure 
improvements, a free-rider problem might exist. Smaller businesses would allow 
the larger ones to make the necessary improvements, while neglecting their 
responsibility. 
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The businesses within the new development receive little or no direct tax 
break in the process. When the new businesses pay their taxes to the State and 
local taxing bodies, however, the increment is channeled back to the 
municipalities, so they can make the needed improvements and payoff their 
bonds (if any were sold). Ideally, ifTIF is successful, all parties gain. Private 
investment is encouraged with infrastructure improvements and a healthier 
business climate. The cities gain an expanded infrastructure and a growing 
economy, and increased tax revenues down the road. The state gains 
infrastructure improvements, a stronger economy, and increased tax revenues in 
the future as well. However, the state can not benefit completely from a higher 
tax base until the bonds are retired. 
As mentioned before, the law was amended in 1985 to include sales tax 
increment. This change was partly in response to municipalities long time 
concern that they finance all of a redevelopment project and only enjoy a small 
share of the increase in tax revenue. Municipalities were given until January 1, 
1987, to set up sales tax TIF districts. The maximum life a district could be set up 
for was 23 years. Over 100 TIF districts were set up in 1986. So far, cities have 
sold close to $400 million dollars in bonds and contracts to finance improvements 
and attract investment. Don Eslick, Executive Director of the Illinois Tax 
Incremental Association (ITIA), believes that cities flocked to TIP as a direct result 
of the State's underfunding of municipalities (11/12/92). 
As the size of the program has grown, Governor Jim Edgar wants to 
discontinue State funding. The program was not fully funded in 1992, and the 
Governor vetoed the appropriation for 1993. In fact, the TIF cut was the largest 
single cut in the Governors veto package (Ayers 20). While the legislature did 
manage a compromise with the Governor during the November 1992 veto session 
to return a portion of the increment back to the districts, a trend of severe 
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underfunding emerged. Many TIF advocates are furious about this trend. Local 
Government magazine states, "It is ironic that when reinvesting in America's cities 
is capturing national attention, Illinois is moving in the opposite direction" 
(6/1/92). This argument definitely holds merit. At a time when cities need the 
most help attracting investment, the State appears to be neglecting them. 
Proponents of TIF also feel that the State's lack of support will cause more 
harm than just decreased investment. This is because the cities have rougWy $400 
million dollars in outstanding bonds. Local Government concludes, "TIF was a 
deal the State made with its municipalities to encourage redevelopment of 
blighted areas. The cities plunged into projects and borrowed money on the basis 
of that promise" (6/1/92). The Peoria TournaI Star adds credence to this argument 
by stating, "We sympathize with Edgar's budget problems. But to pass them on to 
cities that borrowed money because the state promised to pay the debts is wrong" 
(7/11/92). This lack of funding by the State may cause long term problems 
outside TIF as well. If cities believe that the State has not been honest with them, 
they may be hesitant to enter into further partnership agreements in the future. 
While there are many supporters of TIF, it is not without opposition. The 
higWy respected Chicago Business letter, Crains, believes that "TIFs are one of the 
all time great economic development boondoggles in Illinois" (9/14/92). Many 
people also have the perception that 'TIF has been misused to finance 'sweetheart' 
deals with local developers at state expense" (Ayers 21). Whether this is true or 
not, there are clearly differences in the level of blight and deterioration among 
districts. Many argue that development would have occurred in some of these 
districts without the aid ofTIF, and that these developments merely shift jobs and 
tax revenue from non TIF areas into the newly developed TIF districts resulting in 
no net gain. 
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With this background infonnation in mind, this study has the following 
research objectives. First, the impact on the state resulting from the sales tax TIF 
program will be analyzed. It is obvious that most cities, developers, and investors 
love TIF. The state's relationship with TIF, however, has turned sour. It must be 
detennined whether the state has made a mistake by withdrawing its support. 
After the data are analyzed, the current policy stance of the state will be evaluated 
to see if it is making a mistake by withdrawing its' support. 
Secondly, a case study of the three TIF districts in Bloomington will be 
conducted. Net job and tax revenue growth will be examined to see if districts are 
merely transferring income or if they are creating jobs and revenue. Local impact 
from TIF will be also be compared with the impact on the state, because what is 
good for a single entity may not necessarily be good for the whole. The research 
will be completed in the following order. First, the theoretical framework will 
analyze the costs and the benefits for the state. Then, the economic model used 
for the state and the results obtained from the model will follow. Next, the case 
study of Bloomington will isolate and examine three different TIF districts. 
Finally, the conclusion will tie the paper together and offer policy advice for the 
state. 
Theoretical Framework 
Many projects can be conceived as a stream of yearly benefits and a stream 
of yearly costs over their life. With TIF, there are costs and benefits to both the 
city and the State. Since the cities have few complaints about TIF and the State 
has many, this portion of the research will analyze the benefits and costs of TIF 
from the State's perspective. 
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The direct financial benefits to the State should include the increased sales 
tax revenues resulting from the higher tax base in the TIF districts. There is some 
argument as to whether all of this increment should be counted as a benefit, or if 
development and the resulting increase in sales tax revenues in certain districts 
would have occurred anyway. Supporters of TIF often cite one of the most 
important statutory restrictions which states, "that the corporate authorities 
ascertain that the area would not reasonably be expected to be developed without 
the adoption of the tax increment plan" (McClure 262). Yet opponents believe that 
many municipalities have violated the spirit of the law. While there may be some 
problem with this, a Department of Revenue study found only five or six 
questionable districts out of one hundred and thirty (Eslick 11/12/92). 
It is important to realize that when the sales tax amendment was added in 
1985, the cities were entitled to 100% of the increment. In 1988, however, an 
amendment was added that reduced the increment payment to 80% of the first 
$100,000 in sales tax increment, 60% of the next $400,000 and 40% of additional 
revenues. This means that the state does not have to wait until a district is 
dissolved to profit from the higher tax level. It is now reaping benefits during the 
district's life as well. For this study, all incremental revenues retained by the state 
will be counted as a benefit, while the argument that growth would have 
occurred anyway in some districts will be explored separately. If a problem 
exists, the benefits of the higher tax base will be qualified. 
The increase in the tax base is not the only benefit from TIP. The 
infrastructure improvements, new developments, new jobs, and the better 
business climate that results are obviously direct benefits at the local level, but the 
state benefits as well. New jobs mean an increase in state income tax revenue, and 
additional income resulting from job creation has a multiplier effect on sales. 
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Also, infrastructure improvements might lure out of State investment. In other 
words, a better local business climate would be an indirect benefit to the State. 
The financial cost to the State should be the lost tax revenue due to 
increment payments. This tax forgiveness is an opportunity cost, because the 
foregone revenue could have been used for something else. Opponents of TIP 
believe that the State's support will grow to a massive level. One Department of 
Revenue study estimated the total State cost of TIF will be $800 million dollars 
(1987). The result of the DOR finding will be compared to the results here. 
There are also indirect costs that must be accounted for. One of Governor 
Edgar's top advisers believes that growth in a TIF district merely transfers growth 
from other areas in the State, as well as areas in the municipality (Ayers 23). 
There is definitely merit to this argument. A restaurant or shopping mall being 
built does not mean that demand for those goods will go up. However, if the new 
development produces an export (out of state) good or attracts out of state income 
in some way, revenue is generated. Furthermore, if there is job creation, there 
will be more income to spend on products, and revenue will be generated. Yet 
even if there is a massive transfer of income from one area to the next, there 
should not be a zero-sum gain. If the area gaining sales tax receipts and jobs is 
truly a blighted area, many positive externalities may result. Criminal activity 
may decline and the entire city will experience more balanced growth. Also. the 
new development should increase competition between existing businesses, 
which leads to a healthier business climate. 
The Model 
The research will be conducted in a two stage process. The first stage will 
analyze increases in state revenue (benefits) and state expenditures for TIF 
7 
(costs). The second stage will analyze benefits and costs that do not fit easily into 
the first stage's present value formula. 
For stage one, the data come from the Illinois Department of Revenue. 
These data are a year by year analysis of every individual TIF district. It states 
the initial sales tax base and the increment for every district since 1986. 
Direct costs and benefits for the first seven years of the program are 
derived as follows. For these years (1986-1992) there is data dividing the total 
sales tax increment into the portion retained by the state and the portion 
disbursed the districts. The amount kept by the state is the direct benefit to the 
state, while the amount disbursed is the opportunity cost. Increment has been 
kept by the State for two reasons. First, the 80/60/40 change mentioned earlier 
has allowed the State to retain a large portion of the increment since 1988. 
Second, the program has not been fully funded each year. Because of this, the 
state has received some benefit prior to 1988, and even more benefit after 1988. 
Remember, the increased increment kept by the state is a benefit because an 
assumption that investment would not have occurred without TIP is used. 
Projecting the total increment level for each of the remaining years will not 
be as easy. Past increases in increment levels must be used as a reference. Here 
is the actual percentage increment growth for each year: 
YEARS PERCENTAGE GROWTH 
1987 to 1988 45% 
1988 to 1989 37% 
1989 to 1990 27% 
1990 to 1991 43% 
1991 to 1992 15% 
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With the exception of 1990 to 1991, the increment has increased at a 
decreasing rate every year. This can largely be explained because the districts are 
operating close to full capacity. Once a development has been operating at 100% 
capacity for a couple of years, growth (and the resulting tax base) should start to 
stabilize. The 43% growth rate in 1991 may be caused by the second wave of TIF 
development. The State offered a longer funding period for cities issuing bonds 
between 1988 and 1991. As a result, over thirty cities entered into extensive TIF 
programs during this time. With almost all of the TIF districts finished or nearly 
finished with their development projects, the increment will most likely increase 
in smaller proportion for each year. Furthermore, the few districts that have not 
been developed yet will be hesitant to enter into large projects, considering the 
State's underfunding of the program so far. With this in mind, the increment 
should continue to increase at a decreasing rate. It will be estimated to increase 
10% in 1993, 9% in 1994, 8% in 1995, 7% in 1996,6% in 1997, and 5% for the 
remaining years of the program. It is stabilized at 5% because sales tax revenue 
from successful businesses tends to rise a little each year. It must be 
remembered, however, that with only six years of data on TIF, these numbers are 
purely estimates and the opportunity for a bias exists. 
Full funding under the 80/60/40 formula will be assumed. For simplicity 
purposes, 60% will be the increment disbursed to the cities or the direct cost to 
the state. Finding the state cost will not be as easy as taking 60% of the 
increment, however. Since each district has a different ending date, the full sales 
tax increment from each district is going to be received by the State at different 
times. As soon as a district's life has concluded, the state will no longer have any 
more increment expenditures to that district. Because of this, the ending date of 
every individual district must be taken into account. While the ending dates for 
all the districts were not available, the dates that the bonds must be retired were. 
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They will be used as a proxy for the end of a district. For the few districts that 
did not sell bonds, the average of the other districts will be used for an ending 
date. 
In reality, a district may remain active for the entire twenty three years of 
the program. However, all of the increment generated in a specific district must 
be used for improvements in that district or to retire bonds used to finance the 
improvements. Most municipalities set up their bond schedule in relation to the 
expected incremental tax growth in the districts. For the majority of the districts 
that sold bonds, all of the improvements were made at the start of the program. 
The increment is now only being used to retire the bonds. Since no more 
improvements are being made, as soon as the bonds are retired, the districts will 
become inactive. For example, Bloomington's Veterans Parkway TIF district was 
financed by ten year bonds, but incremental growth has been so great that the 
bonds will be retired in seven years (Hamilton). As soon as the bonds are retired, 
Bloomington will dissolve the district and the state will receive the full sales tax 
increment. However, if a district cannot retire its bonds on schedule, it has the 
opportunity to reschedule its debt payment and continue to receive increment up 
until the twenty third year. The effects of some districts dissolving before their 
bonds were initially supposed to be retired, and others refinancing their debt 
past their initial deadline should offset each other and make the final bond 
payment date a justifiable ending date for the districts. 
The different funding formulas for districts will also be investigated. If a 
municipality sold bonds before June 1, 1988, after July 29, 1991, or never issued 
bonds, it is scheduled to receive 100% of the 80/60/40 increment until 1998. In 
1999, only 90% of the 80/60/40 is sent back to the cities. This 10% reduction 
continues until 2007. No payment of State sales tax increment will be made to 
these districts after 2007. 
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For municipalities issuing bonds between June I, 1988 and July 29, 1991 
full funding is provided for the next fifteen years. Starting in the sixteenth year, 
funding is reduced 10% per year until the twenty-first year when funding is 
eliminated entirely. 2011 will be the final year that the State will disburse sales 
tax increment to these districts. 
Each year, revenues and costs must be adjusted to present value. 1993 will 
be the base year used in order to determine past and future benefits and costs 
today. Therefore, any benefits and costs prior to 1993 will be adjusted forward, 
and any benefits and costs after 1993 will be discounted. This is done by 
multiplying the amount by a discount factor. The discount factor is dependent 
on the number of years from the reference point and on the interest rate. For this 
study the rate of interest will be 6.5%. This number was found by taking the 
average monthly interest rate on one year government treasury bills from 1986 to 
1992. Multiplying the amount of cost or benefit by the discount factor yields the 
same result as using the following formula: 
P.V.=A/ (1+r)n 
Where A= Amount; n=years due; r= interest rate 
The discount rate answers the question, how much would have to be invested 
today at the market rate of interest to yield each of the annual revenue or cost 
figures in each of the future years. If a project's benefits are all in the future, but 
the costs are in the present or past, the difference between the actual dollar 
amount and the present value amount will be greater for the benefits than the 
costs. In other words, just using the actual dollar amount would overstate the 
benefits. 
In summary, the annual projected incremental payment from the State 
will be calculated using the following steps. The examples that follow the steps 
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are purely hypothetical and address a limited time span. They are used for 
simplicity purposes. 
1. All of the TIF districts' 1992 increment levels will be multiplied by 10% 
to achieve the 1993 incremental growth. This 1993 increment will be multiplied 
by 9% to achieve the 1994 growth. This process will continue in the manner 
outlined previously. 
TIFS Expire 92 Inc. 1993 Incrm. 
(92 x 1.1%) 
1994 Incrm. 
(93 x 1.09%) 
1995 Incrm. 
(94 x 1.08%) 
TIFA 1994 $2000 $2200 $2398 $2590 
TIFB 1995 $3000 $3300 $3597 $3885 
TIFC 1999 $25000 $27500 $29975 $32373 
TOTAL $30000 $33000 $35970 $38847 
2. The yearly increment level will then be multiplied by 60% to achieve the level 
that would be sent back to the municipalities if no districts were expired (under 
80/60/40). 
YEAR INCR.	 STATE COST 
(If none expired) 
1993 $33000 $19800 
1994 $35970 $21582 
1995 $38847 $23308 
3. As soon as a TIF district expires, its total sales tax increment is kept by the 
State and must be counted as additional State revenue. Thus, the 60% given to 
the district in step 2 is added back into the state's benefit. This is done for every 
year. For instance, if a TIF district expires in 1996, the State would benefit from· 
the increased level forever, not just for that year. 
YEAR INCR.	 STATE COST LESS 
(If none exp.) 
1994 $35970	 $21582 TIF A $1439 
1995 $38847 $23308	 TIP A $1554 
TIFB $2331 
4. The net cost for the state will then be figured. The amount in step 3 is 
subtracted from the amount in step 2 to yield this result. 
1993 $19800-$0= $19800 
1994 $21582-$1439= $20143 
1995 $23308-$3885= $19423 
5. The net benefit retained by the State is the total increment calculated in step 1 
minus the disbursement in step 4. 
1993 $33000-$19800=$13800 
1994 $35970-$20143=$15827 
1995 $38847-$19423=$19424 
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6. Starting in 1999, the special funding formulas need to be factored in. If a 
district receives 90% funding in 1999, its increment level is multiplied by 6% to 
yield the additional state revenue. This is because 90% of the 60% State 
expenditures would be 54%. The remaining 6% is kept by the State. Like the 
calculations in step 3, these adjustments are subtracted from step 2 to yield total 
disbursement. The adjustment process is similar to step 3 as well. This method 
is used for the remaining years. 
7. For each year, the cost and benefit to the state will be adjusted to present 
value. 
In order to analyze all these benefits and costs in an organized manner, the 
following framework will be used. Six columns will be set up with each column 
containing the following information. 
1. The YEARS will be listed chronologically from 1986 (start of sales tax TIF) 
until 2012 (the first year that the State will not make any increment payments). 
2. The STATE COST will be listed as actual data from 1986-92 and as projections 
from 1993-2012. 
3. Similar to column 2, the STATE BENEFIT will consist of actual data from 
1986-92, and projections from 1993-2012. 
4,5. These two columns will contain the state cost and state benefit in PRESENT 
VALUE for each year. 
6. This column will contain the percent of increment RETAINED by the state in 
each year. As the percentage rises, so should the net benefit for the state. 
As previously mentioned, part two examines benefits and costs not 
accounted for in part 1. The data come from the Illinois Tax Incremental 
Association as well as the Department of Revenue1. These figures include 
breakdowns between public and private investment, breakdowns between local 
1The author would like to thank Lois Mills, legislative aid to State Senator John 
Maitland, and Don Eslick, Executive Director of the Illinois Tax Incremental 
Association, for their overall assistance and their help in obtaining relevant 
data. 
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and state expenditures, job creation, and type of business activity being 
performed in the district. 
If development in a TIF district is largely financed by TIF funds, the TIF 
program might be viewed as a massive "public works" program. However, if 
private investment is large, the TIF money can be viewed as more of a catalyst 
that encourages private development. Also, if a large portion of the TIF money 
comes from the local sales and property tax increment, the State cannot claim to 
be bearing the burden for local development. However, a small level of local 
support would violate the local/State partnership intentions ofTIF. 
Results 
The results from 1986-1992 are very straight forward (see Table 1). The 
State came close to fully funding TIF until 1989. However, in 1991 and 1992, the 
State retained 59% and 74% of the increment for its own use. Over the first six 
years, 76.5 million actual dollars has been disbursed to the municipalities, and 
85.6 million actual dollars of increment has been retained by the State for its own 
use. Adjusting to present value, these numbers are 95.2 million dollars and 99 
million dollars respectively. In other words, the increment sent back to the 
municipalities is worth 95.2 million dollars today, and the increment retained by 
the State is worth 99 million dollars. While the benefits here outweigh the cost 
for the state, it is only because the state has not fully funded the program. The 
projected figures for years 1993-2012 will show the consequences of a fully 
funded program. 
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Table 1.
 
Actual State Expenditures on TIP 1986-1992
 
(In Millions)
 
P.V. P.V. PercentYears Cost Benefit Cost Benefit Retained 
1986 2.4 .4 3.7 .6 14% 
1987 9.8 1.8 14.3 2.6 15% 
1988 9.7 7.3 13.3 10 43% 
1989 11.4 7.3 14.7 9.4 39% 
1990 13.8 9.9 16.7 12.0 42% 
1991 17.4 24.9 19.7 28.1 59% 
1992 12 34 12.8 36.3 74% 
TOTAL 76.5 85.6 95.2 99 
The results from 1993-2012 strengthen the municipalities' side of the 
argument (see Table 2). If the State were to fully fund the TIP program, the 
disbursement to the cities would increase to a high of $44.6 million in 1997 and 
decrease for every following year. The amount of increment retained by the 
State, however, would increase every year. Starting in 1994, the percentage of 
increment retained by the State would increase yearly. This can be explained by 
TIF districts that will expire and the reduced funding formulas that take effect in 
1999. In fact, in 1999, the percentage of increment retained by the State would 
exceed 50%. The state cost from this point forward would decrease at an 
extremely rapid rate until the final payment in 2011. 
Adding the 1986-1992 and 1993-2012 numbers together gives the total cost 
of TIF to the State. The State would spend $569.4 million dollars ($440 million 
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Table 2.
 
Projected Costs/Benefits for 1993-2012
 
(In Millions) 
Year Cost Benefit P.V. Cost P.V. Ben. % Kept 
1993 34.0 22.7 34 22.7 40% 
1994 38.0 26.6 35.6 25 41% 
1995 41.0 28.7 36.1 25.3 41% 
1996 42.0 32.7 34.8 27.1 44% 
1997 44.6 34.5 34.7 26.8 44% 
1998 43.5 39.6 31.8 28.9 48% 
1999 42.5 44.7 29.2 30.7 51% 
2000 37.4 54.1 24.1 34.8 59% 
2001 :35.4 60.7 21.4 36.7 63% 
2002 24.0 77.0 12.2 39.1 76% 
2003 22.6 83.4 12 44.5 79% 
2004 22.1 89.2 11.1 44.7 80% 
2005 19.7 97.2 9.3 45.8 83% 
2006 14.8 107.9 6.5 47.7 88% 
2007 10.8 118.1 4.5 52.4 92% 
2008 9.0 126.2 3.5 49.2 93% 
2009 6.7 135.3 2.5 49.5 95% 
2010 3.1 146.0 1.1 50.2 98% 
2011 1.7 156.4 .5 50.5 99% 
2012 0 164.4 0 50 100% 
TOTAL 492.9 1645.4 345 781.6 
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adjusted to present value) in disbursement payments. While this seems like a 
large financial burden, it is dwarfed in size by the amount of increment retained 
by the State. The total benefit to the state would be $1.73 billion ($881 million in 
present value). Even though the majority of the costs will be in the present and 
the majority of the benefits will be in the future, the benefit level is so great that 
adjusting it to present value still produces a benefit over two times the cost. This 
study only calculated retained increment as a benefit until 2012. However, it 
must be remembered that the State will benefit from this higher tax base every 
year after 2012. 
As previously mentioned, expenditures and retained increment are not the 
only costs and benefits of TIF. The Illinois Tax Incremental Association recently 
surveyed the TIF districts to discover what type of business activity was being 
performed in them (6/30/92). Sixty-three sales tax districts are in a central 
business district (downtown area); Seventeen districts primarily support a 
shopping mall or commercial strip; Thirty-six districts support mixed 
development (restaurants, shopping centers, auto dealerships, eeL); Finally, three 
districts are industry oriented. 
These preliminary figures point toward some potential benefits and costs. 
Having such a large number of TIF districts in downtown areas is definitely a 
benefit. Many municipalities are experiencing a migration away from the 
downtown area. The result is often a highly developed suburban area and an 
abandoned central business district. The high number of downtown TIF districts 
suggests that municipalities will be experiencing more balanced geographical 
growth. Furthermore, the presence of new businesses in an older area should 
increase positive social activity and reduce criminal activity. 
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The creation of new jobs is another benefit of TIF. According to a survey 
of municipalities by the ITIA2, 5065 permanent and 2076 part time jobs have been 
created as a result of TIF. If the average salary per worker is $12,879 dollars per 
year3, the increase in State income tax can be computed. Using the 3% annual 
income tax rate and assuming that two part time workers count as one full time 
worker, the State has gained $2.35 million in increased income tax receipts. 
This increase must be qualified. There are only three sales tax TIF districts 
listed as industrial4• Since a large percentage of the TIF districts support 
restaurants or retail services, there may be a transfer of income and jobs from non 
TIF area to TIF districts. However, if there were a transfer, it would hurt the 
cities more than it would the state. The State's support for the TIF program for 
years 1986-1991, relative to the municipalities, has been 37% (see figure 1). In 
other words, local sales and property taxes have accounted for 63% of all TIF 
revenues. Because over 60% of the TIF revenues come from local authorities, the 
risk for the municipalities is much greater. While this does not rule out a 
transfer, it seems foolish for municipalities to create TIF districts if they are not 
generating net growth. 
Another area that must be investigated is the breakdown of private and 
public investment in the various TIF projects (see figure 2). According to the 
ITIA, "Each TIF dollar results in $3.65 worth of direct private investment" 
(Spring 1992). This $3.65 acts as an investment multiplier. Multiplying the total 
state cost of $564 million by 3.65 yields a private investment figure of 2.1 billion 
dollars. If the municipalities continue to fund 63% of the program, their cost will 
2The survey was not completed by all municipalities, so these numbers might 
be smaller than the actual figures. 
3This manner in which this number was derived is discussed in the case study. 
4 While there are only three industrial sales tax TIF districts, there are over 
thirty property tax TIF districts (where the State is not involved). Industrial 
districts simply do not generate much sales tax revenue. 
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TOTAL TIF SUPPORT 1986-1991
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D State Sales-$65 mil. 
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be over a billion dollars, and the private investment generated will be 3.7 billion 
dollars. Adding the two investment figures together gives a total private 
investment of over five and a half billion dollars. This seems like a pretty good 
return on the State's investment (see figures 2). 
Case Study 
Like most municipalities, Bloomington became interested in TIF in 1986 
when the law was changed to include sales tax increments. Bloomington set up 
two districts in June of 1986. One district is along Veterans Parkway and the 
other one is along Market Street on the city's west side (Krebs D1). A third 
district was set up in downtown Bloomington in December of 1986. The 
Veterans Parkway district, along interstate 55, contains the Jumers Hotel and 
Conference Center, "Auto Row" with three new car dealerships, and Lakewood 
Plaza, a 200,000 square foot center anchored by Wal-Mart (Status 1). The Market 
Square district contains many restaurants and retail shops, while the downtown 
area contains office space and small retail stores. 
After the districts were set up, Bloomington had to decide how they were 
going to finance them. The city sold 7.2 million dollars in ten year bonds to 
finance the Veterans Parkway district, 7.3 million dollars in twenty year bonds to 
finance the Market Square district, and 3 million dollars in twenty year bonds to 
finance the Downtown district (Status 1-3). Bloomington used all General 
Obligation (G.O.) Bonds. G.O. bonds are secured by the full faith and credit of 
the municipality. They are attractive to investors because even if an increment in 
the TIF district does not materialize, the G.O. bonds (unlike many other bonds) 
still must be paid off by the city (Dirks). The city likes the G.O. bonds because it 
pays a lower interest rate due to the reduction in risk to the investor. 
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All three of the districts have been successful in creating sizable tax 
increments and stimulating growth and investmentS (see Table 3). The sales tax 
increment in the Market Square district has grown at a slower rate due to its' 
seriously depressed condition prior to TIE All together the three TIF districts 
have created $8.3 million dollars in sales tax increment during the TIF program. 
While this large figure indicates the possibility that growth might have occurred 
anyway in some of these areas, Bloomington officials claim the large figure is 
merely a result of a successful TIF program and not a result of TIF districts being 
set up in high growth areas. City Manager, Tom Hamilton described the 
condition in the districts prior to TW. "Along Veterans Parkway, there was no 
development, no intersections, and no utilities from Jumers all the way south to 
Lakewood Plaza and the area was prone to chronic flooding. In the Market 
Square district, most homes were on individual wells, and there was no storm 
water retention, and in the downtown area, vacant buildings were commonplace 
and jobs were leaving by the dozens (Hamilton)." There are few who would 
claim that the Market Square and downtown areas were not severely depressed, 
but many have questioned the level of blight in the Veterans district. Department 
of Revenue Director, Doug Whitley states, "Any 12-year old would recognize that 
(the Veterans Parkway area) was likely to be a high-growth economic area for that 
community" (Predergast AS). With the Veterans district receiving so much 
publicity, it is necessary to investigate it further. 
Prior to 1986, the Veterans area received little attention from private 
investors. Local developer, Larry Hundman, had apartment starts out on the land 
that is now the TIF district, but no money to finish them (Hamilton). After 
observing the lack of progress within the area, the city set up the TIF district and 
SIn the two cases where there was $0 in incremental growth, new businesses 
had not been set up and development had not been completed. 
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built two major intersections which "opened up large parcels of land for 
development" (Status 1). The city also constructed roads, water-mains, sewers, 
and part of the Constitution Bike-Jogging Trail. These improvements helped 
bring roughly forty million dollars in private investment (Hamilton). Dividing 
$40 million by $7.2 million (money generated from bond sales) yields a private 
investment figure of $5.55 for every TIF dollar. This is well ahead of the state 
average. 
Table 3 
Yearly Sales Tax Increment 
Market Square Downtown Veterans 
1987 $21,486 $84,965 $4,220 
1988 $0 $94,707 $0 
1989 $6,042 $300,606 $872,758 
1990 $21,871 $276,423 $1,653,836 
1991 $252,732 $272,816 $1,625,954 
1992 $537,855 $615,645 $1,691,581 
Another positive effect of the rapid growth in the Veterans district is that 
as soon as the bonds are retired, the state can enjoy the higher tax base. Tom 
Hamilton states, "While the bonds were supposed to be retired in 1997, 
Bloomington will most likely retire them in December of 1993, and if it weren't for 
the state's underfunding of the program, the bonds would have been retired by 
now." Yet TIF opponents remain adamant. Governor Edgar's TIF advisor states, 
.. 
'The implication of the law is to help support a distressed or economically 
depressed area. I would find it hard-pressed to characterize (Veterans Parkway) 
as distressed or economically troubled when it started out as farmland" 
(Prendergast AS). However, even if private investment had eventually occurred 
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along Veterans, it would not have occurred so extensively in such a short time. 
The state stands to enjoy $1.7 million in annual sales tax increment from the 
Veterans district alone starting at the end of 1993. Considering that prior to the 
conception of the TIF district, private development had only tried to build 
apartments (unsuccessfully), the area was nowhere close to being a "high growth 
area". 
There does exist a strong incentive for municipalities to set up TIF districts 
in potentially high growth areas. James Paetsch states, 'TIF authorities must 
make an earnest attempt to reduce their risks. Assuming this to be true, it is only 
logical that administrators will attempt to assemble TIF districts with a high 
potential for future growth that will strengthen the tax base and can almost 
ensure an increment, thus reducing risk" (Bingham 96). With a high growth area, 
municipalities can almost be certain that the increment will be sufficient to payoff 
the bonds. While the Veterans district prior to TIF does not fall into the category 
of a high growth district., it is possible that commercial growth could have 
eventually occurred. However, even if growth would have occurred without TIF, 
the Veterans district is a net benefit for the state due to the quick retirement of the 
bonds and the high level of sales tax growth. 
There is one aspect of the Veterans district that is a benefit for the city and 
not for the State. In the mid-1980's, Jumer Hotels was looking for a city in Illinois 
to build a hotel. Bloomington promised to build Jumers a conference center with 
TIF money if they located there. Jumers took the bait and decided to locate in 
Bloomington. While this increased the tax base and economic opportunities in 
Bloomington, the state as a whole did not gain. If Jumers had not located in 
Bloomington, they would have most likely located in another part on the state, 
and the state would still be receiving taxes from them. 
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For Bloomington, Jumers is more than just a hotel. The conference center 
attracts various businesses and groups from all over the state. In this sense, 
Jumers is more like a primary business as opposed to a tertiary business. The idea 
behind the primary / tertiary business argument is that cities should not tailor 
their development policy to attract service related businesses like hotels and 
restaurants (tertiary). They should be more interested in attracting industries 
(primary), because it they can do this, the service sector businesses will follow. 
However, with the conference center being used frequently by out of town guests, 
it acts as a primary business in the sense that these guests create the demand for 
more service related businesses to accommodate them during their stay in 
Bloomington. 
Because of all the attention focused on the Veterans district, the other two 
districts often are over looked. The Market Square district provides needed goods 
and services for the west side of Bloomington. This area had been deteriorating 
for years and had experienced an increase in crime. With few employment 
possibilities in the area, the opportunity cost for drug use and crime were 
relatively low for residents without the transportation or the desire to work in 
other parts of the city. Sociologist William Julius Wilson states, "..as the prospects 
for employment diminish, other alternatives such as welfare and the 
underground economy are not only increasingly relied on, they come to be seen 
as a way of life" (Wilson 57). However, with the influx of new service related 
businesses, this opportunity cost should be raised. 
TIF has also been able to take the place of other social programs in urban 
areas that have been cut by the state. Mayor Jesse Smart comments, "(l1F) has 
helped greatly as other urban programs like Revenue Sharing, Community 
Development Block Grants and Urban Development Action Grants have been 
reduced or eliminated" (Status 4). By increasing employment opportunities and 
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improving on poor infrastructure, TIF has gone to the heart of the problem and 
more than picked up the slack for some of these programs. 
The third TIF district, located in Bloomington's downtown, is similar to 
downtown areas in other cities.. As new development occurs on the periphery of 
cities, businesses and jobs move out of the downtown area leaving vacant 
buildings to deteriorate. In Bloomington, "Heritage Enterprises (with the aid of 
TIP) is developing over 50,000 square feet of space in four contiguous buildings 
for office and retail uses. This project is also the first large scale historical 
redevelopment project in the downtown area" (Status 4). The goal of the 
downtown district is not so much to create jobs, but to maintain them. However, 
the city has been extremely impressed with the number of new businesses that 
have decided to locate downtown instead of in other areas (Hamilton). With all 
of Bloomington's growth on the east side, maintaining and creating jobs in the 
downtown area will foster a more balanced and diverse business climate. 
The actual number of new businesses and new jobs in the three TIP 
districts indicate a benefit for the city and the statei'. There have been twenty nine 
businesses that have located in the Veterans district. Of these twenty nine, four 
are relocations from other areas in the city and the rest are new. These businesses 
have created 351 full time and 427 part time jobs. In the Market Square district, 
there are eleven new businesses and two relocations. These businesses have 
created 87 full time and 92 part time jobs. Finally, in the downtown district, there 
are twenty two new businesses and seven relocations which are responsible for 
497 full time and 40 part .time jobs. About half of these jobs in the downtown 
district are new and the other hall are jobs that the TIP district has helped to 
maintain. For instance, Union Insurance and First of America Bank are 
6The information on the new businesses within the TIF districts comes from 
the City Manager's office, while the information on job creation comes from 
the survey conducted by the ITIA. 
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responsible for 226 full time jobs in Downtown district that existed prior to the 
district's conception. 
All together, TIF is responsible for roughly 935 full time and 559 part time 
jobs for a total of 1492. Subtracting the 226 from the Downtown district yields a 
figure of 1266 full time jobs and 559 part time jobs Almost all of these jobs are in 
the retail trade or service sectors. Between 1986 and 1990, these two sectors 
experienced job growth in McLean County from 22, 423 to 27, 698 employees 
(County Business Patterns). This means that of the 5275 new retail and service 
jobs in McLean County, about 1825 or 35% are a result of TIF. One qualifying 
factor to consider is that the average salary for service and retail jobs in McLean 
County in 1990 was only $12, 879, while the average for all jobs was $22,159. Still, 
these salaries are incomes that were not being made before. Also, the higher the 
level of services in a community, the more likely other businesses and industry 
will be attracted to and remain in an area. It is not a coincidence that 
Bloomington is the headquarters for State Farm Insurance (Corporate and 
Regional Headquarters), County Companies Insurance, Diamond-Star Motors, 
and The Illinois Farm Bureau. Furthermore, the level of services has helped 
attract events such as the Annual Corvette Show, National and World Softball 
Finals, the illinois Special Olympics, and Illinois High School Association athletic 
events. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the TIF program appears to be an extremely worthwhile 
investment on the part of the State. The increases in sales and income tax 
receipts are obvious benefits. Also, the level of private investment created 
proves that the TIF program is not a "public works" program, but rather a 
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catalyst for development. Other benefits such as an extremely competitive 
business climate, revitalized downtown areas, and urban improvement also must 
be considered. 
The majority of the State's problems result from the sunset law requiring 
all of the districts to be set up by January I, 1987. This caused a rush to set up 
districts. These districts all are starting to prosper at the same time. Hence, the 
state is now facing the majority of the opportunity costs. If the State had used 
more of a "rolling admissions" style, the costs would not be nearly as condensed 
into a short period of time. Furthermore, if the State had more time, it could 
review the districts more closely. 
While the total cost of $569 million ($440 million in present value) is a 
huge investment, the total benefit must be examined. The 1987 Department of 
Revenue study estimated the total State cost of the TIF program at $800 million. 
The DOR study was before the 80/60/40 laws were written, so it estimated the 
state would disburse $800 million to the TIF districts and not be able to retain 
increment until the districts expired. This study, however, predicts a total cost of 
$231 million less than the DOR study. More importantly, over $1.73 billion in 
increment is estimated to be retained by the end of the program. This translates 
to over a billion dollar difference between the two studies. 
In the case of Bloomington, TIF has been a remarkable program for 
development and redevelopment. The Market Square, and the Downtown 
districts are classic examples of deteriorating areas being revived with 
infrastructure improvements, private investment, and job growth and retention. 
While state officials have attacked the Veterans district for violating the spirit of 
the law, the state stands to benefit immensely from this district. For all of the 
complaining, the state will receive 100% of the increment or $1.7 million per year 
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by the winter of 1993. This is amazing considering the state has retained a large 
benefit already due to severe underfunding of the program. 
For future research, the recent compromise legislation between the 
municipalities and Governor Edgar could be examined The State agreed to 
extend the funding period for districts issuing bonds and guarantee a minimum 
funding level of $12 million per year (Legislators 1). While this legislation gives 
needed stability to the TIF program, it shifts more and more of the financial 
benefit to the state. With incremental growth of $48 million 1992, the state is 
keeping 75% of the benefit. Also, many municipalities will now have to refinance 
their debt. In the case of Bloomington, city officials are looking into rescheduling 
the debt for the Market Square district; because the reduced payments by the 
state will not be enough to retire the existing debt. 
In conclusion, the State receives many benefits from TIE It entered into a 
mutual agreement with its municipalities, yet it refuses to live up to its 
obligation. Governor Edgar's TIP advisor states, "TIP is not a net advantage for 
the State in most instances" (Ayers 23). First of all, TIF is a net advantage for the 
State. However, even if it was a zero-sum gain (which obviously is not the case), 
the program would still be a success. TIF is not meant to be a huge net benefit 
for the State. Its purpose is to aid redevelopment in municipalities. Any benefits 
the State receives should be counted as bonuses. Secondly, the State made a 
commitment to the municipalities. Over $400 million in bonds were sold with 
the understanding that the State would help retire the debt. If the State does not 
honor this obligation, municipalities will have to resort to other means to retire 
the bonds. Finally, the economic integrity of the State is at stake. Governor 
Edgar makes the paradoxical claim that the TIF cuts were made for economic 
reasons. However, with a direct net benefit of $1.16 billion, it makes little sense 
that the State would cut a program that costs an average of $15 million dollars 
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per year (over the 26 year period). The State should realize the benefits, honor 
its' obligations, and fully fund the TIF program. 
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